The processes of financialisation and economic performance by Sawyer, M
This is a repository copy of The processes of financialisation and economic performance.




Sawyer, M orcid.org/0000-0002-4565-5276 (2017) The processes of financialisation and 
economic performance. Economic and Political Studies, 5 (1). pp. 5-20. ISSN 2095-4816 
https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2016.1274523
© 2017 Economic and Political Studies. This is an author produced version of an article, 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=reps20
Download by: [Malcolm Sawyer] Date: 24 February 2017, At: 04:18
Economic and Political Studies
ISSN: 2095-4816 (Print) 2470-4024 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reps20
The processes of financialisation and economic
performance
Malcolm Sawyer
To cite this article: Malcolm Sawyer (2017) The processes of financialisation and economic
performance, Economic and Political Studies, 5:1, 5-20, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2016.1274523
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2016.1274523
Published online: 05 Feb 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 7
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The processes of financialisation and economic
performance
Malcolm Sawyer
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ABSTRACT
The paper considers the relationships between financialisation and
economic performance. Financialisation is a persistent feature of
industrialised capitalism, the nature of which differs over time and
space. The present era of financialisation (since circa 1980) has
been a world-wide phenomenon proceeding from different start-
ing points and developing at different speeds, and can be viewed
through the lens of variegated financialisation. The major features
of the present era of financialisation are outlined. The increased
scale of the financial sector leads to the issue of the relationship
between financialisation and economic performance, and whether
the additional resources used in the financial sector have been
socially beneficial. The paper is completed by some brief remarks
on the possibilities of de-financialisation.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationships between financialisation
and economic performance. In order to do that the paper begins with, in section two,
some remarks on the general nature of financialisation, which is viewed as a persistent
feature of industrialised capitalism. The nature of financialisation differs over time
and space. The waves of financialisation have involved different characteristics includ-
ing the nature of the relationships between the financial and real sectors. The differ-
ences of the processes of financialisation can be viewed through the lens of variegated
financialisation. In section three the features of the present era of financialisation
(since circa 1980) are outlined. These features have included the global nature of
financialisation with virtually all countries involved, albeit that the rapid growth of
their financial sector in some countries started later than in others (e.g. the former
COMECON countries for obvious reasons). Whether the increased scale of the finan-
cial sector leads to the issue of the relationship between financialisation and economic
performance and whether the additional resources used in the financial sector have
been socially beneficial are examined in section four. Section five is a brief enquiry
into possibilities for de-financialisation.
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The nature of financialisation
The term financialisation has been variously defined and conceptualised, and syno-
nyms such as financialised capitalism have been used. The general notion of financial-
isation is here viewed in terms of the growth of the financial sector: ‘financialization
means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies’
(Epstein 2005, 3). However, it is necessary to extend that notion in two ways. The
first is to recognise that financialisation involves political and social dominance of the
financial sector as well as the economy, and the second is to explore the forms which
the growth of the financial sector takes in a specific time and place.
Financialisation (in the sense of growth of the financial sector) has been a long-
standing feature of capitalist economies. Money (in the sense of that which is used as
a means of payment) is a credit/debt relationship. Whatever the ways in which money
developed, it facilitated trade and exchange and acted as a financial asset. Money gen-
erally, but not universally, took a physical form which enabled a form of record keep-
ing in an age when most were illiterate. But the physical form should not be
interpreted in terms of commodity money in the sense that it is the value of the com-
modity, e.g. gold which gives money value. It is rather that money should also be
viewed as a credit/debt relationship. Banks developed in the fourteenth century Italy.
Banks were engaged in the provision of finance for trade (often international) in
‘mercantile capitalism’. Minsky (1988) argued that modern capitalism had developed
out of ‘mercantile capitalism’ (in which banks merely provide finance for trade). The
greatly increased financial requirements of industrial capitalism, to finance fixed cap-
ital with a much longer period of turnover or return, gave rise to ‘financial
capitalism’.
The financial crisis of 1929 on Wall Street, and the banking crises of the early
1930s through Europe and the USA involved a period of what may be termed de-
financialisation as the financial sector was much diminished in economic and political
importance. Managerial capitalism had emerged, as reflected in the publication of
Berle and Means (1932) with the idea that effective control of large corporations was
passed from owners and shareholders to managers, and that managers would pursue
objectives of size and growth.
Vercelli (2014) identifies two periods of acceleration of the long-term processes of
financialisation. The first is dated from the second half of the nineteenth century,
through to the start of the Great Depression around 1929. The second which is still
ongoing started after the end of the Bretton Woods era (1971). Two observations can
be made on this periodisation. The first is to be mindful of the geographic scope of
financialisation. In the first period much attention is placed on the financial sectors of
the USA, and a range of European countries (notably UK and Germany), though
there were some global aspects in that portfolio investments were made by those
industrialised countries in other countries. But the financial sectors of those other
countries were not on the scale of the industrialised countries. The second is how the
period of the 1950s and 1960s (the ‘golden age of capitalism’) is to be represented in
that it also often involved growth of the financial sector in the industrialised econo-
mies, albeit within a framework of controls and regulations that had gradually been
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reduced. The 1950s and 1960s for the industrialised countries can be seen as a recov-
ery from the de-financialisation of the inter-war period.
The focus of attention in this paper is financialisation in the present era which is
dated from circa 1980. In the next section the features of financialisation in that era
are considered, and that is followed by the effects of financialisation on economic
performance.
The period since circa 1980
The era since circa 1980 has been variously identified as a neo-liberal era (and related
with the coming to power of Thatcher and Reagan in UK, USA respectively and the
policy directions which they sought to follow), an era of globalisation (with the
growth of international trade, foreign direct investment and capital flows) and one of
financialisation. The three are not mutually exclusive and indeed are more likely three
mutually reinforcing phenomena. Our attention here is on the financialisation.
Financialisation has not been limited to the industrialised countries of North
America, Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, it is one of the remarkable features of the era
of financialisation since circa 1980 that financialisation has been a nearly global phe-
nomenon. In our studies the focus has been on European countries where the Central
and Eastern European Economies experienced particularly rapid financialisation after
1990. Bonizzi (2013) views financialisation as a non-linear process which assumes dif-
ferent forms in developing countries as compared with advanced countries and has
country-specific forms. He views this as a key theme with the implications of financi-
alisation for non-financial investment, with firms increasingly engaging in financial
rather than productive investment. There is a transition to a more market-based
financial system in many countries which had often relied on forms of directed credit
through the banking system. The expansion of foreign banks into the domestic mar-
ket is a common development. Financialisation has its impact on developing countries
through the indirect route of commodity prices and their fluctuations.
Ashman and Fine (2013) provide a brief summary of the main features of the era
of financialisation since circa 1980. We use that structure as our starting point and
then add to it. The first feature identified is the rapid expansion of financial institu-
tions and financial markets, a feature which has been shared with earlier periods of
financialisation. It has, however, been particularly noted that financial markets have
grown in relative importance as the range of financial assets being traded expands.
Bank deposits (as included in the M2 measure of money) averaged 85.3% in 1990, ris-
ing through 90.0%, 102.6%, 120.7% and then 126.1% in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010
respectively1. The volumes of trading and the turnover of financial assets have also
grown rapidly. For a range of industrialised countries (14 European, plus USA,
Canada, New Zealand and Australia) the median ratio of stock market capitalisation
to GDP rose from 31.9% in 1990 to 35.3% in 1995, then 97.1% in 2000, 84% in 2005,
before falling back under the impact of the stock market crashes following the finan-
cial crisis to 70.5% in 20102. There have been dramatic rises in the ratio of financial
assets to GDP, and also of financial liabilities to GDP, at the national and global lev-
els. The figures in Figure 1 illustrate the simultaneous growth of financial assets and
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liabilities within the Euro area for the whole economy (and hence including house-
holds) and for non-financial corporations.
Financial institutions have often been a mixture of privately owned (and presumed
to be profit maximising), mutual and co-operative owned and state-owned. Mutual,
co-operative and state-owned can often be viewed as ‘double bottom line institutions’
(DBLI) in that they have in general to at least break even (and hence some notion of
profitability observed) and to pursue a range of social objectives such as provision of
funds for groups excluded on gender, ethnicity, for environmental projects, etc. A fea-
ture of the present era of financialisation has often been some decline of mutual and
co-operative ownership and particularly the role of state ownership.
Financial assets and liabilies of all economic agents.











































Financial assets:GDP(%) Financial liabilies:GDP(%)
Figure 1. Financial assets and liabilities for euro area countries. Data source: based on statistics
given in Ferreiro and Gomez (2016, Table 1).
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The structure of the banking sector, in particular, has tended to change in the
directions of becoming more concentrated (though some, such as in the UK, were
already highly concentrated), less regionalised as regional banking gave way to
national banking and more internationalised3.
The second feature has been the de-regulation and liberalisation of the financial
system. This has gone alongside the general trends towards de-regulation of the econ-
omy. Financial liberalisation has involved de-regulation of domestic financial systems
and liberalisation of capital movements between countries. Pressures from the finan-
cial sector to throw off the restrictions of its operations played a major role.
Mainstream economics and finance theories help to promote financial liberalisation as
efficiency enhancing. Many others, particularly drawing on the work of Minsky, have
pointed to the de-stabilising effects of de-regulation particularly in the form of unsus-
tainable credit booms (see, for example, Arestis 2016).
Thirdly, the present era of financialisation has involved the expansion and the pro-
liferation of financial instruments and services. It has been associated with the birth
of a whole range of financial institutions and markets, developing and trading a spec-
trum of new financial instruments with corresponding acronyms, which are bewilder-
ingly complex. The complexity of the financial instruments has meant that the risk
evaluation of the financial instruments becomes virtually impossible. The development
and growth of financial derivatives and securitisation (such as mortgage backed secur-
ities) has been particularly significant in their consequences for risk and crisis.
At a systemic level, financialisation has been defined in terms of the dominance of
the financial sector over industry which is the fourth feature identified. Nonfinancial
corporations have necessarily been caught up in the process of financialisation as they
have increasingly derived profitability from their financial as opposed to their pro-
ductive activities. Financial institutions increasingly become owners of equity. Minsky
(1988) used the term ‘managed money capitalism’, which he viewed as emerging from
managerial capitalism. Managed money capitalism involved the growth of pension
funds, mutual funds such that ‘a large portion of the outstanding shares of major cor-
porations is now owned by these large institutional holders’ (Minsky 1988, 32).
Money managers are a large and active part of the market for securities with the
trend towards an increase in the proportion of financing taking place through markets
rather than through financial intermediaries. Under managed money capitalism the
financial and operational independence of corporate management is diminished.
The pursuit of shareholder value by financial institutions has been viewed as a cen-
tral feature of financialisation (e.g. van der Zwan 2014). There are implications, gener-
ally adverse, for the levels of investment and innovation by corporations from the
pressures for the pursuit of short-term profits and dividends.
Fifth, the present era of financialisation is strongly associated with market mecha-
nisms, neo-liberalism and globalisation. Globalisation and financialisation have seen
much greater capital flows between countries and gross flows on a much greater scale
than net flows. Globalisation and financialisation have interacted in that the financial
sector grows to facilitate international trade and foreign direct investment. Global
financial markets and linkages between national financial markets intensify. The
period of financialisation has also been associated with generally rising inequality over
the past three decades. This has been well documented in, for example, OECD (2011).
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The financial sector itself contributes to inequality through, for example, payment of
large bonuses. In many countries the wage share has declined substantially, with con-
sequent effects on the level of aggregate demand. Rising income inequality has been
seen adding to pressures for consumer credit to maintain consumption levels.
Sixth, there has been substantial rises (relative to income) of household borrowing
and the extension of credit. Household debt to income ratios have generally risen.
Figure 2 illustrates the position for the G7 countries in respect of household liabilities
relative to nominal disposable income. Although there are substantial differences in
their starting levels all showed a trend which was particularly pronounced in the mid-
2000s. Alongside rising household debt have gone rising household financial assets
and net worth.
An interesting question here is the underlying forces promoting that rise in con-
sumer debt. In the build-up to the financial crisis, and particularly relating to the
United State, rising inequality and stagnating real wages have been seen as a force
pushing particularly low income households into acquiring debt as a means of main-
taining living standards and enabling home ownership. Rising household debt requires
an increased willingness of banks and other financial institutions to lend to house-
holds and an increased willingness of households to acquire debt. Rising property pri-
ces, particularly in the years preceding the global financial crisis, enabled the use of
housing as collateral for borrowing.
Seventh, there is the penetration of finance into a widening range of both eco-
nomic and social reproduction – housing, pensions, health, and so on, which has
been a continuing feature of financialisation, leading to societal transformation. Van
der Zwan lists as the third characteristic of financialisation, the ‘financialisation of the
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Figure 2. Household liabilities as percent of disposable income. Data source: OECD Economic
Outlook, Annexed Tables, various issues.
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and middle-class households in financial markets through participation in pension
plans, home mortgages and other mass-marketed financial products. Finance has
become a decentralised form of power … exercised through individuals’ own interac-
tions with new financial technologies and systems of financial knowledge. By partici-
pating in financial markets, individuals are encouraged to internalise new norms of
risk-taking and develop new subjectivities as investors or owners of financial assets’
(Van der Zwan 2014, 102). The trend away from social provision of pensions to pri-
vate provision through funded schemes draws people into complex financial decisions
and expands the scale of the financial sector. The rise in household borrowing and
debt is another sign of the increased involvement of households with the financial
sector.
Finally, financialisation is associated with a particular culture which is to be inter-
preted broadly. It ranges, for example, from the shifting from admiration and envy to
antipathy to those who work in finance, but equally is attached to an ethos of reliance
upon the market and the use of the state merely as an agent of last resort. Thus, the
material culture of financialisation is much more than a set of ideas or images, or an
ethos of being for or against the market, but is closely integrated with the public and
private institutions that have evolved during the course of the rise of finance itself
(see, for example, Fine 2013).
These are general features of financialisation, but the growth of financial sectors
has been pervasive across the world. The specific forms they take vary from country
to country, and the timing of these developments similarly varies. The term
‘variegated financialisation’ can be used to signify the pervasive but differentiated
forms of financialisation4.
Financialisation, growth and crisis
The intention of this section is to provide an overview of the empirical work, which
bears on the question of the relationship between financialisation and economic per-
formance. This includes the growth of the financial sector and growth, the occurrence
and costs of financial crisis, financial liberalisation and growth, pursuit of shareholder
value and investment, and financialisation and inequality.
Finance and growth
There is a long-standing literature on the relationship between the size of the financial
sector (often summarised in terms of financial development and financial deepening)
and the pace of economic growth. The growth of the financial sector has often been
evaluated under terms such as financial development, financial deepening, and the
perceived role of financial development as a promoter of savings and investment (in
terms of raising the level of savings through the provision of liquidity and financial
assets, an assumed causal relationship from savings to investment, and the monitoring
roles of financial institutions). Financial deepening, often measured by variables such
as bank deposits to GDP, focuses on the growth of the formal financial sectors and
also is a dimension of financialisation. That literature has generally found a positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth, though the causal
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES 11
relationships involved are matters of debate. A more recent literature has tended to
find a much weaker relationship, and often finds an inverted U-shaped relationship
such that industrialised countries are often operating on the negative part of
the curve.
Levine (2005) in his extensive review of the empirical literature concluded that ‘a
growing body of empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies,
individual country-studies, time-series studies, panel-investigations, and broad cross-
country comparisons, demonstrate a strong positive link between the functioning of
the financial system and long-run economic growth. … Theory and empirical
evidence make it difficult to conclude that the financial system merely – and automat-
ically – responded to economic activity, or that financial development is an inconse-
quential addendum to the process of economic growth’ (2005, 921). Arestis,
Chortareas, and Magkonis (2015) in their meta-analysis of the empirical evidence on
the effects of financial development on growth noted that overall results support a
statistically significant and economically meaningful positive effect running from
measures of financial development and deepening to economic growth.
However, a host of studies have been published in the past five to ten years sug-
gesting that the relationship between size of the financial sector (including financial
deepening) and economic development (particularly economic growth) has weakened,
and evidence of a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship emerging with most
developed countries now lying on the negative sloped portion of the relationship. As
these studies use econometric analysis and require a substantial number of observa-
tion points, it is often the case that these results pertain to a period of the past three
decades or so.
Rousseau and Paul (2011, 276) find that the finance-growth link is not as strong in
more recent data as it was in the previous studies which covered the period from
1960 to 1989. Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012) argue that there can be ‘too much’
finance, and their results ‘suggest that when credit to the private sector exceeds 100
per cent of GDP finance starts having a negative effect on output growth’. Cecchetti
and Kharroubi (2012)5 reached two significant conclusions. The first is that the size
of the financial sector has an inverted U-shaped relationship with productivity growth
and that after some point further enlargement of the financial sector tends to reduce
growth. They interpret these findings in terms of a large financial sector drawing
scarce resources away from the rest of the economy and the adverse effects of finan-
cial booms and busts on growth. They conclude that ‘more finance is not always
better’ (2012, 14). Sahay et al. (2015) use a broad measure of financial development
and find that the effect of financial development on growth is inverted U-shaped,
with the effects weakening at the higher levels of financial development, coming from
financial deepening rather than from greater access or higher efficiency. The weaken-
ing effect is viewed as impacting on total factor productivity rather than on the accu-
mulation of capital. When the pace of financial development is relatively rapid then
financial deepening can lead to economic and financial instability.
Cournede, Denk, and Hoeller (2015, 6) in an OECD study note that ‘over the past
fifty years, credit by banks and other intermediaries to households and businesses has
grown three times as fast as economic activity’. Based on 50 years of data for OECD
countries, they conclude that further growth of the financial sector as far as most
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OECD countries are concerned is likely to slow down the rate of economic growth
rather than raise it.
The particularly significant view to arise from the recent literature is that the previ-
ous findings of positive relationships between financial development and more gener-
ally the size of financial sector with economic growth has weakened and often turned
negative. As such these more recent findings feed into the idea that the financial sec-
tor may have become too large.
Finance and crisis
In the present era of financialisation there has been a burst of financial crises, and the
occurrence of these crises can be linked with financial liberalisation and the ways in
which the financial system has developed. Laeven and Valencia (2013) identify 147
banking crises, of which 13 were borderline events, over the period 1970-2011, and a
further 211 currency crises and 66 sovereign debt crises. In the recent global financial
crisis, the authors identify 13 systemic banking crises and 8 borderline cases in the
period 2007 to 2011. Financial crises impose severe costs on the economy reducing
output and employment, and are part of the general costs of financialisation. Laeven
and Valencia (2013, Table 4) cover the outcomes of banking crises over the period
1970 to 2011. They report the output loss as 23.2% of GDP for all the countries
involved with advanced economies and emerging economies having lost around 33%
while developing countries were immune to significant output losses. The fiscal costs
were estimated at 1.7% of GDP for all countries ranging from 8.3% in advanced
economies to 1.3% and 1.1% in emerging and developing countries respectively.
There were substantial increases in debt averaging 12.1% of GDP across all countries.
It is significant that banking crises do not only lead to falls in output (and thereby
rises in unemployment) but also that that lost output is not fully recovered.
Financial liberalisation and growth
A feature of the present era of financialisation (and of others) has been financial liber-
alisation and de-regulation6. At the theoretical level, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973) propounded the ‘financial liberalisation’ thesis arguing that government restric-
tions on the banking system restrain the quantity and quality of investment. The
financial liberalisation thesis argues for the removal of interest rate ceilings, reduction
of reserve requirements and abolition of directed credit programmes. In short, that is
to liberalise financial markets and let the free market determine the allocation of
credit. With the real rate of interest adjusting to its equilibrium level, low yielding
investment projects would be eliminated, so that the overall efficiency of investment
would be enhanced. Further, as the real rate of interest increases, saving and the total
real supply of credit increase, which induce a higher volume of investment. Economic
growth would, therefore, be stimulated not only through the increased investment but
also due to an increase in the average productivity of capital. Moreover, the effects of
lower reserve requirements reinforce the effects of higher saving on the supply of
bank lending, whilst the abolition of directed credit programmes would lead to an
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even more efficient allocation of credit thereby stimulating further the average prod-
uctivity of capital.
Bumann, Hermes, and Lensink (2012) undertook a meta-analysis based on 60
empirical studies. Their meta-regression analysis leads them to the following main
results. First, there is on average a positive but weak effect of financial liberalisa-
tion on growth, their ‘analysis suggests that data from the 1970s generate more
negative financial liberalisation coefficients which suggests that financial liberalisa-
tion policies carried out during the 1970s seem to have a stronger negative rela-
tionship with growth’ (2012, 45). Financial liberalisation, which has been a key
feature of financialisation, is seen to often have negative rather than positive effects
on growth.
Shareholder value, investment and industrial re-structuring
Financialisation has been associated with the rise of the push for the maximisation of
shareholder value, as mentioned above. Financialisation often involves the growth of
the financial sector’s ownership and dealings in equity, and the growth of financial
markets. There have been the speed-up in the trading of equity (as with other finan-
cial assets), and emphasis on short-term share-price performance rather than on lon-
ger-term growth prospects. The particular significance of these developments here
comes from the impact on decisions on investment, employment, output, etc., as
made by corporations.
The advocacy of the pursuit of shareholder value is a route through which share-
holder interests are imposed on managerial interests. It also acts in the interests of
the financial sector who gain from increasing stock market valuations. Lazonick and
O’Sullivan (2000) provide an analysis of the rise of shareholder value as a principle of
corporate governance in the United States with a shift of corporate strategy from
focus on retention of corporate profits and their reinvestment in corporate growth in
the 1960s and 1970s to a strategy of distribution of profits to shareholders with pres-
sures for reduction of labour employment.
Hein (2012) summarises a range of arguments on the generally adverse effects of
shareholder value under financialisation on investment. It is argued that shareholders
(most of whom are financial institutions) impose on corporations a larger distribution
of profits and hence a higher dividend payment ratio. The lower retention of profits
ratio and, on occasions, share buybacks mean reduced internal finance for real invest-
ment. Hein labels this the ‘internal means of finance channel’. A further channel,
labelled ‘preference channel’, arises from the weakening of the preference of managers
for growth (which translates into firms pursuing growth) as managerial remuneration
schemes are based on short-term profitability and share price.
Hein (2012, 116) views the overall effect of financialisation on investment (and
thereby on growth of capital stock) to be negative. ‘Financialisation has been associ-
ated with increasing shareholder power vis-a-vis management and labourers, an
increasing rate of return on equity and bonds held by rentiers, and decreasing man-
agements’ animal spirits with respect to real investment, which each have partially
negative effects on firms’ real investment’. As van Treeck observes, a popular
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microeconomic explanation of that association is the pursuit of shareholder value ‘has
induced firms to develop a larger preference for profitability at the expense of invest-
ment (and potentially jobs and growth)’ (van Treeck 2009, 908).
The need for de-financialisation
The rapid growth of the financial sector over the past three decades has been associ-
ated (as indicated above) with financial instabilities and financial crises. Further, the
empirical work to which reference was made in the previous section suggests that the
scale of the financial sector has a negative rather than positive effect on economic
growth. This accords with the general idea that the financial sector has become ‘too
big’ (Epstein and Crotty 2013). The notion of being ‘too big’ means that the financial
sector is proving a drag on the development of the real sector.
The idea that the financial sector is in some sense too large and does not focus on
its key roles is not a new one, though it is one that has frequently been dismissed by
economists and politicians (not to mention by the financial sector itself). Tobin (1984,
2) voiced sceptical views of the efficiency of our vast system of financial markets and
institutions, which as he noted ‘run against current tides – not only the general
enthusiasm for deregulation and unfettered competition but my profession’s intellec-
tual admiration for the efficiency of financial markets.’ He (Tobin 1984, 14) doubted
the value of ‘throwing more and more of our resources, including the cream of our
youth, into financial activities remote from the production of goods and services, into
activities that generate high private rewards disproportionate to the social
productivity’. A more recent statement of this view is the ‘financial system costs the
economy on a daily basis by attracting too many talented workers, distorting incen-
tives to engage in long-term investments, making poor strategic decisions in manag-
ing firms it controls, and other problems associated with allocation of credit, capital
and talent’ (Epstein and Montecino 2016, 3). Stiglitz argues that ‘much of the ration-
ale for liberalising financial markets is based neither on a sound economic under-
standing of how these markets work nor on the potential scope for government
intervention’ (Stiglitz 1994, 22). He argues that financial innovations often contribute
little to the achievement of economic efficiency, and may well be welfare-decreasing.
Overall he postulates that ‘Improvements in secondary markets do not necessarily
enhance the ability of the economy either to mobilise savings or to allocate capital’
(1994, 22). Zingales (2015, 3) poses the question in the title of his paper which
formed the basis of the presidential address to the American Finance Association of
‘Does Finance Benefit Society’. ‘While there is no doubt that a developed economy
needs a sophisticated financial sector, at the current state of knowledge there is no
theoretical reason or empirical evidence to support the notion that all the growth of
the financial sector in the last forty years has been beneficial to society’. He continues
by arguing that there are both theory and empirical evidence that a component of
that growth has been pure rent seeking, and that a task of academics is to use
research and teaching to reduce the rent-seeking dimension of finance.
Epstein and Montecino (2016) examine the costs of the financial sector to
American households in terms of three components: (1) rents, or excess profits;
(2) misallocation costs, or the price of diverting resources away from non-financial
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activities; and (3) the costs of the 2008 financial crisis. The rents obtained by the
financial sector comes ‘through a variety of mechanisms including anticompetitive
practices, the marketing of excessively complex and risky products, government subsi-
dies such as financial bailouts, and even fraudulent activities, bankers receive excess
pay and profits for the services’ (Epstein and Montecino 2016, 2) and they estimate
the total cost of financial rents as in the range of US$3.6-4.2 trillion between 1990
and 2005. Mis-selling, anti-competitive and fraudulent activities in the financial sector
impose their costs. Dzimwasha (2015) indicates that the 20 largest global banks paid
US$235 billion in fines for a range of mis-selling in the seven years following the
2008 financial crisis. Zingales (2015) reports that fines paid by financial institutions to
US regulatory agencies amounted to US$138.59 billion over period 2010-2014. Fines
imposed in the UK by Financial Services Authority and its successor Financial
Conduct Authority amounted to just under £3.5 billion during the years 2009 to
2015.7 Robert Jenkins (2016) provides a listing the ‘misdeeds’ of banks. He gives over
50 proven cases and 25 currently under investigation. These range from mis-selling
(e.g. of payment protection insurance, interest rate swaps), manipulation of markets
(e.g. precious metals markets, US Treasury Market auction/client sales, and energy
markets), and aiding and abetting tax evasion and money laundering for violent drug
cartels to collusion with Greek authorities to mislead EU policy makers on meeting
Euro criteria, etc.
Misallocation costs, echoing Tobin’s remarks, come from speculative finance which
‘harms the economy on a daily basis … by growing too large, utilising too many
skilled and productive workers, imposing short-term orientations on businesses, and
starving some businesses and households of needed credit. We estimate that the cost
of misallocating human and financial resources amounted to US$2.6-3.9 trillion
between 1990 and 2005’ (Epstein and Montecino 2016, 2). Malkiel (2013, 97) argues
that neither the argument that the increase in fees reflected increasing returns for
investors from active management nor if it was necessary to improve the efficiency of
the market for investors who availed themselves of low-cost passive (index) funds is
supported by the data. ‘Thus, the increase in fees is likely to represent a deadweight
loss for investors. Indeed, perhaps the greatest inefficiency in the stock market is in
‘the market for investment advice’.
For the costs of the financial crisis, Epstein and Montecino (2016) use the estimates
from the Dallas Federal Reserve (Atkinson, Luttrell, and Rosenblum 2013; Luttrell,
Atkinson, and Rosenblum 2013). They report the cost of the crisis ranges from 40%
to 90% of 2007 output over the period 2008 and 2023 during which output is fore-
casted to remain below long-term trend as a consequence of the financial crisis. These
estimates relate to the US and the recent financial crisis. Epstein and Montecino
(2016) overall place the total costs imposed on society as between US$12.9 trillion
and US$22.7 trillion in the period 1990 to 2023, which represents between 66% and
133% of one year’s US GDP.
There is much strength in the argument that as far as most industrialised nations
are concerned the financial sector has become ‘too big’, and as the growth and scale
of the financial sector is part of financialisation, the policy conclusion would be the
need for de-financialisation. In calling for de-financialisation, it has to be recognised
that financialisation also involves the political power of the financial sector, and that
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any moves in the direction of de-financialisation will be fiercely resisted. The view of
a ‘too big’ financial sector involves a number of strands of argument, and the moves
towards de-financialisation in the general social interest would need to be multi-
dimensional. First, the manner in which the financial sector has grown has not been
conducive for investment and savings, though a key role of the financial sector is
viewed as providing financial assets for households to hold their savings, to act as
intermediaries between savers and investors, and to allocate and monitor funds for
investment. Indeed, the basis that the financial development encourages economic
growth was the encouragement of savings and of the allocation of funds for invest-
ment purposes. The ways in which the financial sector has grown in the past three
decades have tended to be away from the fulfilment of those roles, and into the direc-
tion of development and trade in financial assets and derivatives. I have argued else-
where (Sawyer 2016) for policies to aid the establishment of a more diverse set of
financial institutions including local and regional banks, mutual and co-operative
organisations, micro-credit and micro-finance and state development banks which
would be more focussed on the savings-investment links and would be capable of
being closer to their customers and allocating funds in a more social desirable direc-
tion. Second, the growth of financial markets and speculation has diverted resources
into what are essentially zero-sum games. A financial transactions tax (on a wide
range of financial transactions) would aid the discouragement of trading in existing
assets. There is also a case for a broader ranging view of taxation of the financial sec-
tor which is in general under taxed through financial activities tax. Third, the rush to
financial liberalisation and the failures of the regulatory systems were important con-
tributors to the occurrence of financial crises (and thereby to the major costs of reces-
sion which financial crises involve). It has to be recognised that any financial system
will eventually involve instability and crisis. Minsky’s ‘financial instability’ hypothesis
reflects the views that a capitalist economy is inherently cyclical generated by forces
within the system, rather than by ‘shocks’. Finally, ‘market forces are destabilising and
must be constrained to create stability. However, there is no permanent solution to
the problem of cycles because “stability is destabilising”’ (Wray 2016, 72). A period of
stability creates willingness on part of borrowers and lenders to engage in greater
risks. There is the tendency to shift from hedge (income expected to cover interest
and principal repayments) to speculative (income covering interest only in the short
term), and to Ponzi finance where ‘near-term receipts are insufficient to cover even
interest payments’ (Wray 2016, 79). Regulatory reforms have their role to play in
aiding a less crisis-prone financial system. But the problems of regulatory capture
loom large.
Concluding comments
This paper has put the case that the financialisation of the present era has in general
been detrimental for economic performance. It has pointed to the costs which the
financial system imposes on society. It has argued the need for de-financialisation,
and sketched some ways for seeking to do so, though in the full recognition that the
political power of the financial sector will limit the changes of achieving any signifi-
cant de-financialisation.
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Notes
1. Calculations refer to 28 countries, mainly Western European and also USA, Canada,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
2. Figures and subsequent ones in this paragraph are calculated from Financial
Development and Structure Dataset http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/data/
financial-structure-database.
3. For data on EU countries see Detzer et al. (2012).
4. See Brown, Spencer, and Veronese Passarella (2015) for some evidence on the spread of
the financial sector and the differences across countries leading into notions of variegated
financialisation. See also Ferreiro and Gomez (2016).
5. For other studies see, for example, Barajas, Chami, and Yousefi (2012), Barajas et al.
(2013), Rioja and Valev (2004, 2005), Aghion Peter and David (2005), Dabla-Norris and
Srivisal (2013), and Beck, Degryse and Kneer (2013).
6. See Arestis (2016) for further references and discussion.
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